Judith Curry: Framing of the climate change problem

This is a draft by Judith Curry of section 2 of her paper she is writing for a special adition of ‘Climate Change’. The heading for the other sections are:

Reasoning About Climate Uncertainty

1.  Introduction

2. Framing of the climate change problem

3.  Uncertainty, ambiguity, indeterminancy, and ignorance

4.  Consensus, disagreement and justification

5.  Reasoning about uncertainty

6.  Conclusions

 

 

2: Framing of the climate change problem

An underappreciated aspect of uncertainty in climate change is associated with the questions that do not even get asked because of the way that the climate change problem has been framed. Frames are organizing principles that enable a particular interpretation of a phenomenon (e.g. de Boerg et al. 2010). De Boerg et al. (2010) state that: “Frames act as organizing principles that shape in a “hidden” and taken-for-granted way how people conceptualize an issue.” Risbey et al. 2005 state that decisions on problem framing influence the choice of models and what knowledge is considered relevant to include in the analysis. De Boerg et al. (2010) further state that frames can express how a problem is stated, who is expected to make a statement about it, what questions are relevant, and what range of answers might be appropriate.

The decision making framework provided by the UNFCCC Treaty provides the rationale for framing the IPCC assessment of climate change and its uncertainties, in terms of identifying dangerous climate change and providing input for decision making regarding CO2 stabilization targets. In the context of this framing, certain key scientific questions receive little attention. In the detection and attribution of 20th century climate change, Chapter 9 of the AR4 WG1 Report all but dismisses natural internal modes of multidecadal variability in the attribution. Further, the impacts of the low level of understanding of solar variability and its potential indirect effects on the climate are not explored in any meaningful way in terms of its impact on the confidence level expressed in the attribution statement. In the WG II Report, the focus is on attributing possible dangerous impacts to AGW, with little focus in the summary statements on how warming might actually be beneficial to the climates of Canada, Russia and northern China.

Further, the decision analytic framework associated with setting a CO2 stabilization target focuses research and analysis on using expert judgment to identify a most likely value of sensitivity/ warming and narrowing the range of expected values, rather than fully exploring the uncertainty and the possibility for black swans, dragon kings, wild cards, and not to even mention the prospect of natural climate variability. The concept of “imaginable surprise” was discussed in the Moss-Schneider uncertainty guidance documentation, but consideration of such possibilities seems largely to have been ignored by the AR4 report. The AR4 focused on what was known with certainty and on narrowing the uncertainties and raising the confidence levels in an attempt to identify a most likely future scenario. The most visible failing of this strategy was the neglect of the possibility of rapid melting of ice sheets on sea level rise in the main summary conclusion in the Summary for Policy Makers (e.g. Oppenheimer 2007; Betz 2009). An important question to ask is what is the true black swan risk of climate variation (warmer or cooler) under no human influence. Without even asking this question, there seems little to base a judgment upon regarding the relative risk of anthropogenic climate change.

The presence of sharp conflicts with regards to both the science and policy reflects an overly narrow framing of the problem. Until the problem is reframed or multiple frames are considered by the IPCC, these conflicts are not going to resolved, and the scientific debate will continue to ignore crucial pieces of the puzzle and the policy deliberations will likely continue to be stymied.